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TRIAL OF TITLE TO REALTY IN A PERSONAL ACTION
An interesting application of an old common-law doctrine in a civil
law state is found in Ducros v. St. Bernard Cypress Co. (1918, La.)
82 So. 841.1 The plaintiff sued for the value of certain timber which
he alleged the defendant, in possession claiming title, had cut and
removed from his land.. The court held that the petition disclosed no
cause of action since the plaintiff was in effect suing for a disturbance
of possession, which he could not do where the defendant claimed title
to the realty, until the question of ownership had been settled.
Though the majority of the court relied upon a state statute protect-
ing the possession of even a wrongful possessor, the rule of the ancient
common law was similar in the favor which was shown to the person
who had acquired the seisin of land, even though he was not the owner
thereof. It was early settled by statute2 that there could be no dis-
'O'Neill and Provosty, JJ. dissenting.
25 Rich. IL 1381, ch. 7.
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turbance of one's possession of realty, even by the rightful owner, but
that the remedy was a trial of the title.3 So now generally the pos-
sessor has his remedy of an action of forcible entry and detainer
against even the rightful owner for any disturbance of his possession.4
This leads to the further general holding that nothing short of a direct
attack upon the title of the possessor will suffice, and that the title
cannot be indirectly attacked in some other form of action. Thus,
while a personal action such as trover will ordinarily lie for things
actually severed from the realty, yet it is almost universally held that
such action cannot be maintained when the defendant claims title to
the realty.' The courts usually content themselves by saying in justi-
fication of the rule that title to realty cannot be tried in a transitory
action,6 though the real reason would appear to be the historical one
above suggested, that the person in possession under claim of title was
to all intents and purposes the owner until the real owner proved his
superior title. It is, however, asserted that the rule is justified as
preventing the useless litigation that would result if a suit might be
brought for every blade of grass cut, instead of a single suit for eject-
'Coke, Littleton (igth ed. 1832) *257a, note i; Swift's Digest (Rev. ed. i862)
*5iO The rule of the civil law was similar in that it protected the possessor
against all except the person he had dispossessed, and against the latter after
one year. Dig. lib. 43, tit. 17; Savigny, Possession (6th ed. Perry, 1848) 313,
314; 2 Mackeldey's Roman Law (Transl. Dropsie, x883) pars. 24o, 259, 263.
This is in effect the provision of the Code of Practice, Art. 49, La. Rev. Civil
Code, Art. 3456, relied on by the court in the principal case.
"Fults v. Munro (igix) 2o2 N. Y. 34, 95 N. E. 23; see cases collected in ii
R. C. L. 1134ff.
'Anderson v. Halper (1864) 34 Ill. 436, 85 Am. Dec. 318 (replevin); Gunder-
son v. Holland (1911) 22 N. D. 258, 133 N. W. 546 (replevin); Hooker v.
Latham (1896) ix8 N. C. 179, 23 S. E. 1004 (replevin and trover); Pacific Live
Stock Co. v. Isaacs (I9O8) 52 Ore. 54, 96 Pac. 46o (trover) ; Ruggles v. Sand
(1879) 4o Mich. 559 (trespass); Robertson v. Rodes (1852, Ky.) 13 B. Mon.
325 (action on the case); Bigelow v. Jones (183o, Mass.) io Pick. 161 (indeb-
itatus assumpsit); Parks v. Morris, Layfield & Co. (i9o7) 63 W. Va. 51, 59
S. E. 753 (same); Downs v. Finnegan (1894) 58 Minn. 112, 59 N. W. 981
(same). Contra, Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Ross (1904) 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1251, 83
S. W. 635 (assumpsit). Though the point was not discussed the following
cases also seem contra: Single v. Schneider (1869) 24 Wis. 299 (replevin);
Railway v. Hutchins (1877) 32 Oh. St. 57I (trover); Wetherbee v. Green
(1871) 22 Mich. 311 (replevin). Curtis v. Deepwater R. R. (ig9I) 68 W. Va.
762, 70 S. E. 776 (assumpsit) is distinguishable since there the parties had made
an express contract for the sale of the timber. Cases are collected in 85 Am.
Dec. 321; 5 C. J. 1389; 34 Cyc. 1365, 1367; and 38 Cyc. 2o40. In Pennsylvania
the rule is changed by statute in case of replevin. National Transit Co. v.
Weston (1888) 121 Pa. 485, I5 Atl. 569. An extreme application of the rule is
found in Morgan v. Varick (1832, N. Y.) 8 Wend. 587, where the plaintiff,
having spent his -six years in getting his ejectment action tried, was finally
defeated in his trespass action because of the statute of limitations.
'Lehigh Zinc &" Iron Co. v. New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. (3893, Ct. Err. &
App.) 55 N. J. L. 350, 26 Atl. 92o.
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ment in which mesne profits might also be recovered.7 It seems to be
a case where the old feudal rules of policy still persist and that, in
order to prevent an endless clamor, we, too, should treat that man as
owner who is in possession claiming to be owner, so long as no one
else has proven a superior claim to that position." The rule does not
apply in favor of a mere trespasser; there must be actual disseisin,
that is, a bona fide claim of title by a defendant who is in possession of
the realty.9 Nor does it apply to the decision of questions incidental
to the trial of title, where the issue is not directly that of title, as for
instance, where the question is whether or not the adverse possession
has terminated before bringing of suit.10 In the principal case the
plaintiff apparently was attempting to raise the issue of title," - and at
first blush it would appear that the court was holding him to a techni-
cality which would increase, rather than diminish, litigation. But the
rules of policy seem sufficiently strong, so that the decision declining
to consider the issue of title in this form of action is in reality more
than the application of a rule of procedure, and is entirely justified.
Even after the issue of title is determined it is not settled just how
far the owner can go in seeking redress, whether he is limited merely
to a recovery of the mesne-profits from the person who has been in
wrongful possession, together with incidental damage to the realty,
such recovery to be had in connection with the ejectment action, or
thereafter in a separate suit, or is to be then permitted to recover
things severed from the realty in specie or their value. The latter
remedy has been denied against a disseisor, and a fortiori against his
assignee, in the case of severed crops.1 2 It has even been denied in
the case of cut timber" and of severed fixtures.14  It seems, however,
to have been rather generally allowed in all cases except those of
severed crops, i. e., fructus industriales.15  As to unsevered crops,
there seems also to be no question; they go to the disseised owner no
'Powell v. Smith (1833, Pa.) 2 Watts, 126.
' For the analysis of the meaning of "ownership," see Cook, Hohfeld's Con-
tributions to the Science of Law (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 721, 729, 730.
Compare also the rule as to personalty that the possessor is considered as having
title as against all but the true owner, CommENT (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
91, 93.
'Davis v. Easley (851) 13 I11. 192.
Phelps v. Church etc. (19oo, C. C. A. 3d) 99 Fed. 683, 40 C. C. A. 72.
"See the dissenting opinion.
'Jenkins v. McCoy (1872) 50 Mo. 348; Johnston v. Fish (1895) 1O5 Calif.
42o, 38 Pac. 979; contra, Simpkins v. Rogers (1854) 15 Ill. 397; Thomas v.
Moody (1834) 11 Me. 139.
'Roberts Bros. v. Hurdle (1849) 32 N. C. 490.
"
4 Powell v. Smith, supra.
"Page v. Fowler (187o) 39 Calif. 412; Stockwell v. Phelps (1866) 34 N. Y.
363; DeMott v. Hagerman (1828, N. Y.) 8 Cow. 22o.
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matter by whom planted.' 6 It is submitted that the distinction drawn
between fructus industriales when severed and other things, including
fructus naturales, severed from the realty, is proper. Crops are
largely the result of the care and labor put upon them and do not in
any serious measure injure the freehold. It is just, therefore, that the
owner should recover only the net gain." On the other hand, where
things are severed to the permanent injury or depreciation in value of
the freehold, there is no reason why ownership should be changed by
the disseisor's wrongful act, and they should be recoverable to the
same extent as any other objects of property. The principal case does
not make it clear whether or not the court follows this rule, though a
suggestion that it does may be found in the court's reference to a
possibility of suit by the plaintiff after the termination of the adverse
possession.
C. E. C.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The question of whether the doctrine of last clear chance is an
exception to the general rule of contributory negligence is again
raised by the recent case of Ellerinan Lines, Ltd. v. H. and G. Grayson,
Ltd. (1919, Ct. App.) 121 L. T. Rep. 5o8. In this case the defendants,
ship repairers, undertook to rivet cleats to the weather deck of the
plaintiff's steainer. The rivets were heated on the weather deck and
carried to an open hatch, through which they were lowered in a
bucket to the "'tween" deck, where they were driven into the weather
deck by a riveter. A cargo was being discharged from a hold below
the "'tween" decks, and the hatch of both the "'tween" and weather
decks being open, a cargo of highly inflammable jute was exposed
through the hatches to anything falling from the weather deck. A
boy in the employ of the defendants, carrying a red-hot rivet in a pair
of tongs to the bucket, slipped on the deck, and the.rivet fell through
both hatches into the lower deck and set the jute on fire. The case
was tried by the court without a jury. The court held that the
defendants were negligent in doing their work in the manner described
while the jute lay exposed, and (by two of the three judges) that, if
the shipowners were guilty of contributory negligence (as to which
the judges disagreed), then their negligence was not the proximate
cause of the damage and did not prevent a recovery.
Clearly the defendants were guilty of negligence. Was the plain-
tiff guilty of negligence? And if so, did such negligence contribute
to the injury, as an efficient cause between the parties, so as to bar a
recovery by the plaintiff? The evidence showed that the plaintiff
'McGinnis v. Fernandes (i8go) 135 IM. 69, 26 N. E. iog; Craig v. Watson
(1881) 68 Ga. 114; Freeman v. McLennan (i8i) 26 Kan. 151.
17Lindsay v. Winona, etc., Ry. (1882) 29 Minn. 411, 13 N. W. 191.
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had notice of the negligent manner in which the defendants' servants
were carrying the red-hot rivets, and that the plaintiff protested
against the work being done in such manner when the highly inflam-
mable jute was exposed to danger.
Although a person is not delinquent in failing to guard against the
prospective negligence on the part of another,' he is bound to use
ordinary care to avoid a known or obvious danger; and recovery
cannot be had where the party injured could have avoided the injury
by the exercise of ordinary care, even though the defendant was
negligent.2
Contributory negligence is an act or omission amounting to a want
of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff, which, concurring or
co-operating with a negligent act of the defendant, is the proximate
cause of the injury.3 As is pointed out in the principal case, it is not
accurate to say that a plaintiff owes a defendant a duty to use care
to preserve the plaintiff's own property; but rather, "he may not
recover if he could reasonably have avoided the consequences of the
defendant's negligence." For in that event, as Baron Parke put it in
Davies v. Mann,' "he is the author of his own wrong." In other
words, a defendant under the common law is privileged to inflict
injury upon a plaintiff by negligence whenever the plaintiff's own
negligence is a part of the proximate cause of such injury. The
comparative degrees of the negligence of the respective parties will
not, in most jurisdictions, control the question of liability as they do
in admiralty law and a few jurisdictions; but if the plaintiff's neg-
ligence has in any degree proximately contributed to the injury, he
cannot recover.5
Where both the plaintiff and the defendant are negligent, if, at the
last moment, both parties could have prevented the injury by the
exercise of due care, or if, at such time, neither could have prevented
the injury, the plaintiff's negligence bars a recovery.6 However, the
'Kellogg v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (187o) 26 Wis. 223; Fero v. Buffalo and
State Line Ry. (i86o) 22 N. Y. 2og; Holman v. Boston Land & Security Co.
(1896) 8 Colo. App. 282, 45 Pac. 519; Tacomza Lunber & Manfg. Co. v. City
of Tacoma (i89o) i Wash. 12, 23 Pac. 929.
'Nicholas v. Tanner (i9o3) 117 Ga. 223, 43 S. E. 489; Salem Bedford Stone
Co. v. O'Brien (i895) 12 Ind. App. 217, 40 N. E. 43a; Murphy v. Deane (1869)
ioi Mass. 455.
'Cf. Wastl v. Montana Union Ry. (i9oo) 24 Mont. I59, 61 Pac. 9; see St. Louis
S. W. Ry. v. Casseday (i89g) 92 Tex. 525, 527, 50 S. W. 125.
" (i842, Excb.) 1o M. & W. 545, 548.
'Pennsylvania Ry. v. Righter (188, Sup. Ct.) 42 N. J. L. i8o; Wilds v. Hud-
son River R. R. (1862) 24 N. Y. 430; Weaver v. Pennsylvania R. R. (195o) 212
Pa. 632, 61 AtI. iii 7.
'Tobin v. Omnibus Cable Co. (1893, Calif.) 34 Pac. 124; Butler v. Rockland
T. & C. St. Ry. (9o4) 99 Me. 149, 58 Atl. 775. But see contra, Christen v.
Macon Ry. & Light Co. (19o4) 12o Ga. 314, 47 S. E. 923.
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party who last has a clear opportunity of avoiding the injury, is con-
sidered, as between the parties, solely responsible, notwithstanding the
negligence of his opponent.7 This is the original statement of the rule
which is now known as the doctrine of last clear chance. It is said
that this rule simply furnishes a means of determining whether the
plaintiff's negligence is a remote or a proximate cause of the injury,
that before the introduction of the rule, any negligence on the-part of
the plaintiff, which in any degree contributed to the injury, was
treated as a proximate cause, and constituted contributory negligence,
which barred recovery." It is apparent that the doctrine in this form
is not an exception to the general doctrine of contributory negligence,
as has been often thought to be the case." But the negligence of the
defendant, if it intervenes between the negligence of the plaintiff and
the injury, is, as between the parties, the sole proximate cause of the
injury, and the plaintiff's antecedent negligence is merely a condition
or remote cause, and hence not contributory. It should be made clear
that it is only when, at the last momont, the defendant could, and the
plaintiff could not, by using due care, have avoided the injury, that
a plaintiff has a right to recover despite his own negligence.
In the instant case, it seems clear that at the last moment, the
plaintiff, by taking reasonable care, could have avoided the conse-
quences of the defendants' negligent conduct, just as the-defendants
could have prevented the injury at the last moment by devising some
less dangerous method of bringing the hot rivets to the man who was
driving them into the deck. In other words, this is not a case where
at the last moment the defendants, and the defendants only, could by
the exercise of reasonable care, have prevented the injury; but it is
a case of the concurrent negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant
continuing up to the last moment. Thus the judge below and the
dissenting judges in- the Court of Appeal appear to have reached a
more satisfactory conclusion of fact than did the majority of the
Court of Appeal.
The decision of the majority serves to emphasize the inadequacy of
the statement of the rule contained in Lord Penzance's famous opinion
in Radley v. London & N. W. Ry.10  "Though a plaintiff may have
been guilty of negligence, and although that negligence may, in fact,
have contributed to the accident which is the subject of the action,
yet if the defendant could, in the result, by the exercise of ordinary
care and diligence, have avoided the mischief which happened, the
Davies v. Mann (1842) o M. & W. 546.
'See Smith v. Norfolk & S. R. R. (1894) 114 N. C. 728, 750, ig S. E. 863.
'See Keefe v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (1894) 92 Iowa, 182, i86, 6o N. W. 503;
Mapes v. Union Ry. (i9oo) 56 App. Div. 5Q8, 514, 67 N. Y. Supp. 358; COMMENT
(i915) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 330.
11 (1876, H. L.) 35 L. T. Rep. 637.
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plaintiff's negligence will not excuse him."'1  This statement glosses
over the requirement that the defendant, and the defendant only, must
have had the last clear chance to entitle the plaintiff to recover. This
requirement is strongly insisted upon by Salmond,'12 and Pollock,"
and quite properly. A failure to observe this stringent requirement
has apparently led the court into error in the principal case.
RECENT DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
The current law reports in England and elsewhere disclose a number
of cases in which declaratory judgments have been rendered under
circumstances in which the majority of our courts would, under present
practice, have been unable generally to grant any relief. The useful
results achieved in these cases seem to warrant a brief comment upon
them.
Perhaps the most interesting is an English case involving a request
for a declaration of privilege by the plaintiffs who claimed that a
certain sum payable by the British Admiralty in respect of a requi-
sitioned ship lost while in Government service belonged wholly to them
as owners of the ship and that the defendants, the charterers, had no
right to share in it.' The ship had been let by the plaintiffs to the
defendant charterers in 1914 for a period of eight years, under a
condition that if she was lost hire was then to cease from the day of
her loss. In 1917 she was requisitioned by the Admiralty under
terms that if she were lost by war risks, compensation would be made
on her ascertained value. Shortly afterwards she was sunk by the
enemy. The defendants notified the Admiralty that they had an
interest in any sums payable, whereupon the plaintiffs brought this
action for a declaration that the defendants had "no right" to any
compensation and that the sum payable belonged to the plaintiffs
exclusively. It will be observed that the plaintiffs here had no "cause
of action" against the defendants. They merely asserted the defend-
ants' "no right" and their own freedom from a duty to share with the
defendants the Admiralty award (i. e. a privilege). Much the same
problem was involved in the celebrated case of Guaranty Trust Co. v.
,1 Ibid., 638.
Salmond, Torts (4th ed. 1916) 44, 45.
Pollock Law of Torts (ioth ed. I916) 489.
'London-American Maritime Trading Co. v. Rio de Janeiro T. L. & P. Co.
[1917] 2 K. B. 611. Indirectly of course, the plaintiff asserts a right to the
money and to all of it, but this right is against the Government and not against
the defendant. The plaintiff also asserts the defendant's no-right against the
Government as well as his future no-right against the plaintiff after the
plaintiff collects the money from the Government. The suit was doubtless
brought incidentally to advise the Admiralty as to its duties, although not res
judicata as to it.
37
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Hannay2 in which the Guaranty Trust Co. brought an action for a
declaration "that the plaintiffs are not liable to repay to the defendants
any sums paid to them" by the defendants in respect of certain bills
of exchange. After much apparent doubt, the Court of Appeal
decided that though the "cause of action" vested in the defendant,
they were empowered, under the rule authorizing them to "make
binding declarations of right whether any consequential relief is or
could be claimed or not," to make the declaration sought, though it
was in fact a declaration of a "privilege," and not of a "right." 3 The
London-American case illustrates the same legal relation of the parties.
Except in New Jersey, 4 Wisconsin 4a and Michigan,5 our courts have
not yet the power to perform the useful function undertaken by the
English courts in the two cases mentioned, for we have not adequately
recognized that uncertainty in one's legal relations, like a cloud on
title, constitutes a disturbance of the social equilibrium which it is
properly the function of the judicial-machinery to correct and remove.
In another case arising out of the requisitioning of a chartered
vessel by the British Admiralty,6 the declaration was sought by the
charterers, who claimed that the charter-party was not terminated by
the requisitioning but remained in force and hence'that they alone,
and not the defendants, the owners, were entitled to receive the
Admiralty hire. Here again it may be said that the plaintiffs had
no "cause of action," as that term is usually understood, but the
declaration, again one of privilege, was made by the court, with
reference to a referee, at the defendant's option, to determine the
latter's title as owner to share in the hire because of increased risk.
Two other cases illustrate the valuable function by way of pre-
ventive relief involved in the power of a court to construe a contract
before it is broken and a claim for damages has arisen, or to determine
whether a particular act constitutes a breach. In the first, the plain-
tiffs chartered a vessel to the defendants under a charter which pro-
vided for her employment between "safe" ports.7 In February, 1915,
after the German war-zone decree, the defendants ordered the steamer
to Newcastle-on-Tyne to load. The plaintiffs thereupon sought a
declaration that Newcastle was not a "safe" port within the meaning
of the charter-party, and that the defendants by ordering her to that
port had committed a breach of the charter-party which privileged the
2-Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay (C. A.) [1915] 2 K. B. 536; (C. A.) [1918]
2 K. B. 623.
'See (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 9.
' Chancery Act, I915, Public Laws 1915, ch. 116, sec. 7, P. 185.
'a Wisconsin, Act of May 27, 1919, Laws of 1919, ch. 242, p. 253.
'Act printed in (1919) 17 MIcH. L. REV. 689.
6
"Elliott Steam Tug Co. (Ltd.) v. Chas. Duncan & Sons, Ltd. (1918, K. B.)
34 Times L. R. 583. See also note i, supra.
7Palace Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Gans Steamship Line [I916]. I K. B. 138.
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plaintiffs to withdraw the ship from the defendants' service. Before
acting on their own interpretation of the defendants' act and incurring
heavy damages if they proved to be wrong-which, in default of an
injunction, would have been necessary to present the case to an
American court-the plaintiffs sought and obtained a judicial declar-
ation of their rights. The court, in holding that Newcastle was a
"safe" port within the meaning of the charter-party, performed the
useful function of declaring a fact, thus determining the only issue
in the case. Whether this is done by the court alone, or referred to a
jury, it is submitted that such valuable opportunity for relief, before
serious injury or damages have arisen, should no longer be denied to
American courts.
The other case, which arose in New Jersey, involved the construc-
tion of several contracts for future performance, between a water
company and a municipality.' Company A had under contract sup-
plied the city of Bayonne with water, and A in turn had certain
contracts with the defendant company for such supply. A subse-
quently assigned its contracts with the defendant to the city. The
defendant thereupon informed the city that it would no longer supply
water to it, claiming that it was relieved from any further obligations
by the assignment. The city thereupon sued for an injunction re-
straining defendant. from ceasing to supply water to it, and also for a
declaration of the future rights of the plaintiff and the defendant
under several of the assigned contracts. The coure not only issued
the injunction, but also the declaration as to their respective rights
and duties to be enjoyed and performed in the future. Such deter-
mination of future legal relations would not have been possible in
most of our states."
In another case a Government war order, prohibiting the building
of any but standard ships, prevented the defendants from proceeding
with a contract to build two special ships for the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs, after the armistice, brought an action for a declaration that
the contracts were still subsisting and that the defendants were bound
to perform. They did not allege a breach nor did they ask damages.
The declaration sought was denied on the ground that the Govern-
ment's interference had so changed the circumstances that the doctrine
of frustration applied.'0
The combination of a request for an injunction with one for a
declaration of rights is quite customary in England and Scotland, and
serves a useful purpose. The usual bill for injunction is granted
'Mayor & Council of City of Bayonne v. East Jersey Water Co. (igig, N. J.
Eq.) io8 Atl. 121.
' Florida enacted a statute in May, igig, authorizing its courts to declare legal
relations under any written instrument.
1 Woodfield Steam Shipping Co. v. Thompson (1919, C. A.) 36 Times L. R. 43.
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under restricted technical conditions only; should it be dismissed, the
plaintiff obtains, in America, no adjudication of his rights and must
either withdraw his claim or begin a new action at law, while sub-
mitting to an accrual of continuing damages. Should the action at
law be successful, the defendant will have to foot a bill for damages
which would have been greatly diminished had he known earlier that
he was a wrongdoer. Where, however, as in England, the bill for
injunction is combined with a request for a declaration of rights, the
denial of the injunction has usually no such unfortunate results, for
the court may still make the declaration sought and thus enable the
parties to know their respective rights and duties in the premises.:"
Such combined requests are resorted to particularly where the grant
of the injunction seems doubtful, as is most often the case. A
member of a club recently sought an injunction to restrain defendants
from suspending her from membership, plus a declaration that the
plaintiff was a member of the club.1
2
In an interesting case arising in New Jersey the plaintiff and the
defendant were neighboring owners of land under various convey-
ances, each party claiming a right of way over the land of the other.13
The plaintiff brought a bill to have her own land determined to be
free from the claim of her neighbor to a right of way, and her own
claim to such right over her neighbor's land confirmed. It was moved
to dismiss the bill for lack of jurisdiction in equity to grant relief.
There had been no attempt to use the right of way, hence there was no
ground for injunction, or for trespass at law; nor was there any
dispossession, so that ejectment could not be maintained. The ordi-
nary conditions for a bill of peace or a bill quia timet were also absent,
though the relief sought presents certain analogies to a bill of peace.
The New Jersey court found the necessary authority to declare the
rights of the parties in the Chancery Act of 1915, authorizing declara-
tory judgments.' Such determination of conflicting claims to rights
in land might also have been made under a statute in Connecticut,15
' See Islington Vestry v. Hornsey U. C. (C. A.) [19oo] i Ch. 695; Liandudno
U. D. C. v. Woods [18*] 2 Ch. 705.
'Young v. Ladies Imperial Club, Ltd. (1919, K. B.) 36 Times L. R. 70. (Both
requests were denied on the merits.) See also Cassell v. Inglis [1916] 2 Ch.
211; Weinberger v. Inglis (1917, Ch.) 118 L. T. 208.
"Renwick v. Hay (i919, N. J. Eq.) io6 Ati. 547. See also Sharon v. Tucker
(1892) 144 U. S. 533, 12 Sup. Ct. 720.
"Note 4, supra: "Subject to rules, any person claiming a right cognizable
in a court of equity, under a deed, will or other written instrument, may apply
for the determination of any question of construction thereof, in so far as
the same affects such right, and for a declaration of the rights of the persons
interested."
Public Acts, 1915, ch. 174, sec. i. "An action may be brought by any person
claiming . . an interest in . . . real or personal property . . .
against any person who may claim . . . any interest . . . adverse to the
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but in most states it would doubtless have been difficult under the
facts.
In a novel case recently decided in England, the declaration sought
was denied. By a contract made between the plaintiffs and the Sec-
retary of War, the latter hired from the plaintiffs a steam engine and
hay press on condition that the engine should be used only for the
purpose of working the press. It being alleged that the engine had
been used for other than the specified purpose, the plaintiffs sought a
declaration against the new Secretary of War that they were entitled
to compensation for the improper use of the engine and that the con-
tract be construed. 6 It was held that inasmuch as no action could
possibly lie against the Secretary of War on the contract, no declara-
tion against him would be made. An old statutory remedy having
been allowed to lapse, it was intimated that the petition of right was
the only available remedy, although declarations have been made
against the Attorney General even in the absence of a petition of
right.'7  On a claim for money compensation, however, the declaration
would hardly be permitted to take the place of a petition of right.
New Jersey, Florida, Wisconsin, and Michigan now authorize their
courts, with more or less latitude, to render declaratory judgments and
the Bar Associations of Connecticut and of California have recently
recommended legislation in their respective states giving this power
to the courts. Cases are constantly arising in jurisdictions where- the
declaratory judgment is authorized illustrating the valuable results
achieved by this useful instrument of preventive justice, and it is to
be hoped that the other states of this country and the federal govern-
ment will not delay long in availing themselves of its benefits.
E. M. B.
OPERATIVE FACTS IN GIFT OF LAND
A frequent and often-times difficult question arises whether there
has been a proper delivery of a deed to create a gift. Three recent
Illinois decisions relate to this problem under different situations.
In the case of Moore v. Downing (1919, Ill.) 124 N. E. 557, an uncle
executed deeds which he delivered to a party with written instructions
plaintiff . . . for the purpose of determining such adverse . . . interest
. and to clear up all doubts and disputes, and to quiet and settle the title
to the same." See Ackerman v. Union & New Haven Trust Co. (1915) go
Conn. 63, 96 At. i49; (1917) 91 Conn. 500, 5o6, ioa Atl. 22.
eHosier Bros. v. Earl of Derby (C. A.) [1918] 2 K. B. 671.
'Dyson v. Atty. Gen. [19ii] I K. B. 410; (C. A.) [i9iz] I Ch. i58, 167.
Burghes v. Atty. Gen. [1911] 2 Ch. i39, 155; (C. A.) [1912] i Ch. 173. These
cases involved requests for declarations that plaintiffs were exempt from a
requirement to make certain returns on forms submitted by the commissioner
of internal revenue.
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to hold until the uncle's death and then deliver them to the grantees.
The deeds were sealed in an envelope by the holder and placed in a
safe deposit box, to which the grantor later acquired a key. The
grantor continued to exercise full control over the land described in
the deeds; he paid the taxes, renewed a mortgage, insured the prem-
ises, and listed them for sale with a real estate agent. Upon the
uncle's death, an heir sued to secure an interest in the land. His
claim was denied because there had been a valid delivery of the deeds
-a gift to the grantee.
In Weber v. Brak (1919, Ill.) 124 N. E. 654, the grantor executed
a deed to her daughter and placed it in the custody of a notary who
put it in an envelope, on which was an unsigned writing which stated
that the deed was not to be delivered to the grantee until after the
death of the grantor; and that in case the grantee died before the
grantor, the deed was to be returned to the latter. After the deaths
of both notary and grantor, the deed was delivered to the grantee by
the notary's executor. An heir of the grantor sued for his statutory
portion of the land mentioned in the deed and it was -held that he
should recover; the intended gift having failed because there had
been no valid delivery. The fact that the deed was to be returned to
the grantor if he survived the described grantee induced the court to
conclude that the grantor did not hand over the deed unconditionally
to the third party as in Moore v. Downing.
The question reappeared in Pemberton v. Kraper (1919, Ill.) 124
N. E. 611. In this case the grantor, an aged woman, executed a deed
to her daughter and placed it in her bureau drawer. After the deed
had been signed and acknowledged the grantor's step-son took .and
recorded it. The grantor, who was practically bed-ridden at the time,
brought suit to have the deed set aside as a cloud upon the title to her
land. She testified at the trial that she never intended the deed to be
delivered until after her death. There, was conflicting testimony on
this point but the Illinois Supreme Court applied the same test of
"intent" employed in the above two cases and decided that there had
been no valid delivery; because the aged woman did not intend to
relinquish control over the instrument or divest herself of her rights,
privileges, etc., in the land.
To constitute a delivery in law, it is not necessary that the grantor
should make it physically impossible for himself to procure possession
Df the deed.' It is sufficient that the instrument be delivered to a
third person without reserve and with the intention that it shall operate
'Munro v. Bowles (1goo) 187 Ili. 346, 58 N. E. 331, 54 L. R. A. 865, note. In
this case a deed was held to have been delivered, which was found after the
grantor's death, in a trunk to which he had a key. Cf. McKeniey v. Ketchum
(igig, Iowa) 175 N. W. 325, where the deed was found after the grantor's death
in his private box.
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from that time as a transfer of "title."'2 No subsequent act of the
grantor alone can operate to defeat the effect of the delivery,3 i. e.,
change the legal relations of the parties. Nor can a subsequent change
of intention, nor a mental reservation existing only in the grantor's
mind, render a delivery, effected by words and acts, inoperative.
4
The intention of the grantor evidenced at the time of transferring the
instrument controls the determination of whether or not there has
been a valid delivery.5 In other words, at least two facts must exist
to extinguish the rights, privileges, powers, etc., of the grantor in
respect to the land and create similar legal relations thereto in the
grantee: (i) physical transfer of the deed to the third person and
(2) actual or evidenced intention that the transfer of the deed shall
have the described operative effect.
Where a deed is handed to a third person with directions that
it shall not be delivered to the grantee until after the grantor's death,
the question of acceptance presents difficulties. There is a split in
the decided cases; two divergent theories seem to exist. According
to some decisions, actual acceptance by the grantee is essential to effect
a delivery; and this holds true even if the acceptance does not occur
until after the grantor's death. In such a case, it is regarded as
relating back to the time of the delivery of the deed to the depositary."
In these cases acceptance is a third operative fact, without which there
is no gift. But Moore v. Downing, supra, followed what appears to be
the majority rule: that when the terms of the deed are wholly bene-
ficial to the grantee, there is a presumption of acceptance at once on
delivery to the third party, if nothing appears to the contrary, and even
though the grantee is ignorant of the deed. 7 This presumption is
said to be overcome only by the grantee's expressed dissent.8  Some
courts have refused to find such a presumption when the grantee did not
know of the delivery of the deed ;9 and no presumption will be recog-
nized until the grantor's acts come to the knowledge of the grantee.
So few deeds of voluntary settlement are rejected that most of the cases
do not touch upon the question of how or when the deed takes effect.10
The theory that after acceptance by the grantee the delivery takes effect,
'Sneathen v. Sneathen (18gi) IO4 Mo. 2oi, 16 S. W. 497.
3Robbins v. Roscoe (1897) 120 N. C. 79, 26 S. E. 807.
'McMahan v. Hensley (1919, N. C.) IOI S. E. 210.
Trask v. Trask (1894) go Iowa, 38, 57 N. W. 841.
"Foster v. Mansfield (1841, Mass.) 3 Met. 412; Stephens v. Rinehart (1872)
72 Pa. 434; cf. Williams v. Latham (1892) 113 Mo. 165, 20 S. W. 99.
Tireeland v. Vreeland (i8gi, N. J. Ch.) 48 N. J. Eq. 56, 21 At. 627; Mitchell
v. Ryan (854) 3 Oh. St. 377.
' Weuster v. Folin (1899) 6Q Kan. 334, 56 Pac. 490.
'Moore v. Flynn (18go) 135 Ill. 74, 25 N. E. 844.
"0 For a discussion of the problem, see Bury v. Young (1893) 98 Calif. 446, 33
Pac. 338. According to this case the "title" to the land passed "full and corn-
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through the fiction of relation back, as of the date it was handed to
the third party, is not satisfactory; unless, indeed, we are prepared to
hold that the grantor has done an irrevocable act in handing the deed
to the third person. The suggestion that such an act is revocable and
that the grantor has a power to revoke up to the time it is accepted,
has led a few courts to conclude that there is no valid delivery in such
a case as Moore v. Downing." Instead of employing the legal fiction
of relation back, the weight of authority seems to follow the theory
of presumed acceptance, i. e., that where the grantor in delivering the
instrument to the third person parts with all control over it, acceptance
will be presumed.
In these jurisdictions, then, acceptance is not an operative fact to
create a gift of the land. The gift must be complete without the
act of acceptance. Presumably, non-acceptance would be an operative
fact to "revest" the land in the grantor or his heirs.
IN THE MATTER OF Scott v. Shepherd
"The type of theft is taking to one's own use."' But it is a nice
question regarding the law of larceny: whether its proper office is
merely to build a wall and ditch about me in the enjoyment of what
possessions I may have; or whether it exists primarily to discourage
my neighbor when in a covetous moment he breaks the tenth com-
mandment, from giving active expression to his thoughts. Holmes
clearly thought the former. "It was an advance on the old precedents
when it was decided that intent to deprive the owner of his property
was sufficient."'2 But in State v. Kirkland (19i9, N. C.) lO S. E.
56o, the trial court's instruction to that effect was held erroneous, and
intent to convert to the taker's own use was held necessary to larceny;
yet with an "interpretation" which widens the scope of the old rule
considerably: that the requirement was met "by showing an intent
to deprive the owner of his property permanently for the use or pur-
poses of the taker, although he might have in mind to benefit another."
Problems of policy similar, although not so broad, were involved in
People v. Mail and Express Co. (1919, N. Y. Ct. Spec. Sess.) 62 N. Y.
L. J. 1349 (January 21, 1920), a case of prosecution for the conducting
of a lottery in order to increase a newspaper's circulation. Cards,
plete upon the first delivery," so that the depositary became a trustee for the
grantee, and the grantor thenceforward held merely a life estate. Cf. Prutstnan
v. Baker (1872) 3o Wis. 644.
"Wellborn v. Weaver (1855) 17 Ga. 267, 63 Am. Dec. 235, note; Gilmore v.
Whitesides (1837, S. C.) Dudley Eq. 14, 31 Am. Dec. 563.'
' Holmes, The Common Law (1i81) 73.
2Ibid.
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serially numbered, were distributed free; winning numbers were pub-
lished once each in the paper; presentation of the proper card within
five days after publication of a number entitled to the prize; the
card-holder was advised to watch the paper for the appearance of his
number, and advised of places where the paper was to be examined
free of charge. Under the New York Penal Law, "a 'lottery' is a
scheme for the distribution of property by chance among persons who
have paid or agreed to pay a valuable consideration for the chance."3
The court sustained a demurrer to an information setting out the
above facts. Under the statute, as at common law, it would seem that
to constitute a lottery, the facts should be enough, in the absence of
illegality, to put the prize-offeror under a contract duty to deliver the
prize to a winner. But the question whether we have here a set of
unilateral contracts; whether buying, or reading, the newspaper for
a reasonable time in reliance on the cards, would give a card-holder
a right against the company, conditional on his number being drawn-
is, like all doubtful matters of consideration, a question primarily of
policy. Certainly such acts were invited by the company. Certainly
also, the company's promise being aleatory, there can be no contention
of inadequacy of the consideration. Finally, this whole gift-card
scheme was intended to bring gain to the company, through legal
detriment to others, by the inducement of the "distribution of property
by chance." It would seem as though this fairly presented the
situation at which the statute was aimed. The nub of the question
is "valuable consideration." But is it seriously to be questioned that
in a civil suit an unpaid prize-winner who had bought the paper for
a reasonable period, could, in the absence of illegality, have recovered
his prize?
The detection of crime seems to offer legal problems quite as inter-
esting as does its definition; and the Bill of Rights still occupies our
courts.4 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (January 26,
192o) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term 1919, No. 358, develops that the
Fourth Amendment is still a real protection to the individual, and also,
develops that the protection is needed. Two men were arrested.
While they were detained, representatives of the Department of Justice
"without a shadow of authority . . . made a clean sweep" of all the
documents in their offices. Application for the return of the papers
was made and granted. But meantime the Government had examined
the papers, photographed them, etc. Subpoenas to produce the docu-
ments returned were then served, and on refusal the men in question
were punished for contempt.
Sec. 1370.
'See e. g. (192o) 29 YALE LAW TOURNAL, 337, 410.
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"The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that
although of course its seizure was an outrage which the Government
now regrets, it may study the papers before it returns them, copy them,
and then may use the knowledge that it has gained to call upon the
owners in a more regular form to produce them; that the protection
of the Constitution covers the physical possession but not any advan-
tages that the Government can gain over the object of its pursuit by
doing the forbidden act."5
Justice Holmes' masterly opinion makes the sweep and the limits of
the court's position very clear.
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in
a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be
used before the Court, but that it shall not be used at all. Of course
this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and
inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent
source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained
by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way
proposed."
The requirements regarding jurisdiction, especially over non-resi-
dents, continue to plague the profession, whether it be those which are
necessary to bring a judgment within the full faith and credit clause,
or those other and lesser ones essential to the validity of a judgment at
home, as being rendered after due process of law. Chipman, Ltd. v.
Jeffrey Co. (January 19, 1920) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term 1919, No.
516, contains a new warning on the point. There a defendant foreign
corporation, having done business in New York, and appointed a local
agent to receive service of process, had subsequently removed from
the state, but without revoking the appointment of the agent. The
latter was served by the plaintiff with process in a suit arising in no
manner out of the business formerly done in New York. It has
been held that a natural person is not bound by service on his former
agent even where the cause of action arose out of business done within
the state.6 But with a corporation, consent to be bound by substituted
service may be made a condition of admission to do business.7 Is
such consent operative as to causes of action arising elsewhere; and
in any case, does it continue operative as to such causes after the cor-
poration has withdrawn from the state? That, under the New York
law, it does not, was the decision of the court. The discussion in
'For another instance of the court looking behind the mere possession of
documents to the information contained therein, see ibid., 348.
'Flexner v. Farson (1919) 39 Sup. Ct. 97, (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 512.
'Indeed, consent may be imposed even on a natural person, as a condition to
his being admitted to do privileged acts of certain classes within a state, such
as driving an automobile. See (1917) 26 ibid., 422. But the consent was there
limited to suits arising out of the operation of the machine within the state.
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reaching that decision is not wholly satisfying. But that does not
affect the warning of the case: "We do not wish to be understood
that the validity of such service as here involved would not be of
Federal cognizance, whatever the decision of a state court."
From the period when Dodderidge of ,the King's Bench made his
decision turn on his observation-which any man who has ever raised
a puppy will confirm-that "the nature of a dog is such that he cannot
be ruled suddenly," s there have been many cases in the books of equal
interest to the naturalist and to the student of the law of animate
property. Jackasses kept where men would gladly sleep have been
sustained as nuisances.9 The marital ethics of swans have, amid the
pleasant music of Latin elegiacs, been made the basi§ of rules of
property and pleading.10 And Enloe v. Southern Ry. (x919, N. C.)
IOI S. E. 556, adds another to the cases in which the character of
animals is made to bear on the question of negligence. In these
cases, ordinarily, animals have come into collision with a train; the
plaintiff, who has thereby been damaged, is suing the railroad; the
case comes up on his claim that a non-suit was improper because of his
showing that on sight of the animals the engineer failed to slow down,
or give a warning signal. In the case of the turkey, that bird being
"a nervous fowl" and a "long-legged," this contention has been sus-
tained."' But it is otherwise with the phlegmatic goose.1 2 In the
instant case there was a bull. His charge had derailed the train.
The court, in terms, stated its legal conviction that a bull is bull-
headed. 3 "The sounding of the whistle would in all probability have
been regarded as the challenge for battle." So a non-suit in an action
against the railway for injury resulting from the derailment was
sustained.
Consideration for discharge may undoubtedly consist of the giving
up by the person discharged of something of value to himself. A
novel and interesting case, testing how far the law will let the parties
measure what constitutes such value, came before the Appellate Divi-
sion of New York.14 "The plaintiff obtained a decree of separation
from her husband, wherein he was adjudged to pay her $io a week
'Mitten v. Faudrye (1625, K. B.) Popham, 161.
'See (i919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 109; see also, on dogs, ibid.; on horses
in the highway, ibid., 466; and on predatory chickens (1917) 26 ibid., 250.
'o The Case of Swans ('595) 7 Co. I5b, 17a.
"Lewis v. Norfolk Southern Ry. (1913) 163 N. C. 33, 79 S. E. 283, 47 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1125, Ann. Cas. I9i5E 461.
12James v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. (1914) I66 N. C. 572, 82 S. E. IO26, L. R.
A. 19i5B 163, Ann. Cas. 1915B 470.
"It is submitted that this was no bull.
" Gewirta v. Gewirtz (igrg) 178 N. Y. Supp. 738.
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alimony. The defendant failed to pay, and when he owed $i,14o a
motion to punish him for contempt was granted. The defendant
thereupon threatened to suffer confinement rather, than pay; in fact,
he expressed a keen desire to go to jail rather than pay.' Under duress
of this threat the plaintiff was induced to enter into an agreement
. . . whereby, in consideration of the payment of $i,i4o
and in consideration of the defendant waiving his "desire to go to
Ludlow Street Jail,' the parties agreed to live separate," and, the
plaintiff agreed to accept the payment in full satisfaction of her support
and alimony past and future until reconciliation. New alimony
having accrued under the original decree, which was still standing, the
plaintiff made new demand, and procured an order to show cause why
the defendant should not be punished for contempt; the defendant
showed the contract. Said the court: "There was no consideration
for the agreement, 15 nor did it affect the status of the parties. It pur-
ports to be an agreement of separation, but the parties were already
separated by a decree of the court . . . The most that the defend-
ant was entitled to, in consideration of his payment of $I,I4O, was a
discontinuance of the proceeding to punish him for contempt. This
he received. He complains that he waived his desire to go to jail for
contempt of court. He being again in contempt, the opportunity of
fulfilling that desire will be restored to him by the granting of this
motion."
There is of course no accounting for tastes; one man urgently
yearns to go to jail rather than support his wife; whereas another
prefers to find in his wife the means of enjoying a modest competency
in creditor-unmolested peace. And the case of Rowe v. Drohen (Nov.
26, i919, C. C. A. 2d) October Term, 1919, No. 5, does open up unsus-
pected possibilities. A man owed $io,ooo which he had fully made
up his mind not to pay. With a little capital-which did indeed
belong to his wife-he opened up a moving-picture theatre; business
flourished; so did he. The obligations were incurred in his own
name, and he was "sorry to be broke" when things went wrong;
profits were banked in her name, although he was the only one to
draw on the account, and drew for his private as well as for the
" Performance of the preExisting duty to the party discharging is not in cur-
rent theory supposed to constitute consideration. But cf. Anson, Contracts (3d
Am. ed. by Corbin, igig) 135 if., notes; (I919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 406.
What the court says on separation is clearly sound. Remains, then, the "waiver"
of jail-desire. That "waiver" clearly consisted in performing a duty to the
state: not to commit contempt of court. While the wife clearly had an effec-
tive factual interest in the husband's performing that duty, and was willing to
pay for it, it would seem to be sound policy not to recognize the non-commission
of a crime as good consideration for a discharge; it certainly is no considera-
tion for a promise executory.
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business purposes. But when his trustee in bankruptcy attempted to
reach the proceeds of the business, a divided court 8 refused to allow it.
The. husband had "transferred nothing to his wife-because he then
had nothing worth mentioning to transfer." Thus it appears that one
may "do business in his wife's name," in consideration of support-
even though "the measure of support is (as here)" what the husband
happens to decide to take-provided only the original capital, however
small, belongs, from the start, to the wife.
The JOURNAL. has more than once expressed a conviction that the
training of capable legislative draftsmen is one of the crying needs
of our statute-laden time; the case of The Ernestina (1919, C. C. A.
Ist) 259 Fed. 772, drives home that point. Section 3 of the Harter
Act provides that no vessel owner who has used due diligence to
properly man and equip his ship, shall be held responsible for loss
resulting from faults in navigation, or from dangers of the sea. The
Supreme Court has successively held that this section did not relieve
the owner from liability by collision to parties other than his cargo-
owners ;17 that while it relieved him of liability for loss caused by his
servant's negligence, it'did not of its own force entitle him to share in
general average which was made necessary by such negligence;"s
although it did so far change the public policy of the country as to
allow him to make a valid contract for participation in such general
average. 9  In this state of the law, a vessel falling under the Harter
Act met distress by storm, and a portion of the cargo was jettisoned
for safety. A decree was made against the vessel for its share of the
general average. Counsel for the vessel owner took an appeal, sub-
stantially on the position that the act made it possible for the master
of a ship to sacrifice the whole cargo to save his ship, without incur-
ring the age-old duty of contribution to the loss voluntarily sustained
in the common interest. The appellate court found it impossible to
believe that Congress intended to work such a change, in a case involv-
ing no negligence. There is little reason to question the decision; its
policy is sound, and even its rule of construction has ample authority.
But such rules of construction in the teeth of the language found in
the statute20 could arise only where the draftmanship of legislation is
habitually inadequate.
It is interesting to watch law crystallizing at times without conscious
realization by anybody of the process, and then changing its shape
" Rogers, C. J., dissented in a strong opinion. The quotations are chiefly from
the concurring opinion of Hough, C. J., a gem of lucid compactness.
The Delaware (1896) 161 U. S. 459, 16 Sup. Ct. 516.
The Irriwaddy (1898) 171 U. S. 187, i8 Sup. Ct. 831.
The Jason (1912) 225 U. S. 32, 32 Sup. Ct. 56o.
' Cf. e. g. State v. Claiborne (1gig, Iowa) 17o N. V. 417.
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when the full effect of the chance-grown rule becomes clear. The
authorities are now in conflict, for instance, as to validity of a direction
for the postponement of the enjoyment of an absolute gift of an estate
in trust. The English cases uniformly hold that such direction is
void. 21 In Wharton v. Masterntan, where the doctrine was applied so
as to hold invalid a direction to accumulate the income of a fund given
upon a charitable trust, Lord Herschell said: "The point seems in the
first instance to have been rather assumed than decided. It was appar-
ently regarded as a necessary consequence of the conclusion that a
gift-had vested that the enjoyment of it must be immediate on the bene-
ficiary becoming sui juris . . . ." In the majority of American
jurisdictions where the question has come up the English rule has been
followed.22 This doctrine is approved by Gray, on the ground that
"it is against public policy to restrain a man in the use or disp6sition
of property in which no one but himself has any interest ;23 and he
characterizes the opposite rule as a peculiarly irritating and demoraliz-
ing instance of paternalism introduced into our law.24  On the other
side are decisions in the United States Supreme Court,'25 Massachu-
setts,'2 6 Illinois,2" and California28 ; and now Connecticut has joined
this minority. De Ladson v. Crawford (1919) 93 Conn. 402.' The
Connecticut court points out that if the authoritative statement of the
origin of the English doctrine made by the Lord Chancellor in Whar-
ton v. Masterman, supra, be accepted, such doctrine "is not -based
either on public policy or reasoned decision." Indeed it is difficult to
find any vital objection to such a restriction on grounds of public
policy. While the cestui cannot ordinarily sell his interest for its full
value during the period of the postponement of enjoyment, yet such
a handicap is by no means unique, but exists more or less in every case
of a sale of a future interest. There may be good reasons for the
donor's desiring to discourage the donee from disposing of his prop-
erty at once, and such a postponement of enjoyment serves to bring
about such a result. Such a restriction is free of the vice which
inheres in a spendthrift trust, namely, that the beneficiary is protected
-Saunders v. Vautier (1841, Eng. Ch.) 4 Beav. 115; Wharton v. Masterman
[1895] A. C. 186. -
'Huber v. Donaghue (89) 49 N. J. Eq. 125; It re Hall's Estate (1915) 248
Pa. 228, 93 Atl. 944.
Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (3d ed. 1915) sec. 120.
" Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed. 1895) secs. I24L to I24P.
Shelton v. King (1913) 229 U. S. 90, 33 Sup. Ct. 686.
Ctaflin v. Claflin (1889) 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454.
Wagner v. Wagner (IgiO) 244 Ill. ioI, 91 N. E. 66.
In re Yates' Estate (1915) I70 Calif. 254, 149 Pac. 555.
Connecticut, like Massachusetts, had already upheld the validity of a direc-
tion to accumulate the income of a charitable trust. Woodruff v. Marsh (1893)
63 Conn. 125, 137; St. Paul's Church v. Attorney General (1895) 164 Mass. 188,
203, 41 N. E. 231.
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at the expense of his creditors, for here the beneficiary is merely being
protected against himself.3 0  Furthermore, the English doctrine can
be readily evaded by giving to another person a beneficial interest,
however small, in the entire trust fund.31 Thus as the principal case
points out, the only real basis of the English rule is the assumption
that a gift vested in interest will also vest in enjoyment whenever the
donee is or becomes sui juris. "When the proposition is stated in this
way, free from the supposed overpowering authority of a rule of
public policy, it is seen to present, in another form, the more familiar
question whether by postponing the enjoyment of the principal for a
term of years, the testator has attempted to impose an unreasonable or
illegal condition on the gift of his bounty. Such conditions may seem
under some circumstances to be arbitrary and unnecessary, and yet
they may rest upon good reasons known to the testator and not to the
court. '3 2 And the conclusion is reached that "the postponement of
the enjoyment of the principal of a trust fund for ten years is not an
unreasonable exercise of the undoubted right of the testator to impose
conditions on the enjoyment of his bounty."
Kales, Future Interests in Illinois (igo5) sec. 294.
Weatherall v. Thornburgh (877) 8 Ch. D. 261; see Ames Cases on Trusts
(2d ed. 1893) 455.
'DeLadson v. Crawford (1919) 93 Conn. 402, 409-410, lo6 AtI. 326.
